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Abstract:  The economics-of-crime approach usually ignores the emotional cost and 
benefit of cheating. In this paper, we investigate the relationships between emotions, 
deception, and rational decision-making by means of an experiment on tax evasion.  
Emotions are measured by skin conductance responses and self-reports. We show that 
the intensity of anticipated and anticipatory emotions before reporting positively 
correlates with both the decision to cheat and the proportion of evaded income. The 
experienced emotional arousal after an audit increases with the monetary sanctions 
and the arousal is even stronger when the evader’s picture is publicly displayed.  We 
also find that the risk of a public exposure of deception deters evasion whereas the 
amount of fines encourages evasion. These results suggest that an audit policy that 
strengthens the emotional dimension of cheating favors compliance. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Many situations involve deception, like plagiarism, embellished résumés, or trickery 
in sports.  Recent scandals at Enron, for example, remind us that cheating in markets 
is not unusual (Gerschlager, 2005).  Tax evasion and social fraud provide other 
examples of substantial deception by economic agents (Slemrod, 2007).  The standard 
economics-of-crime approach explains deception as resulting from a comparison 
between the expected benefit and cost of cheating.  The cost of cheating is however 
restricted to the monetary consequences of detection, and the cost of the very act of 
cheating is neglected.  Yet, recent studies have provided some evidence of lie or guilt 
aversion (Gneezy, 2005; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Sanchez-Pages and 
Vorsatz, 2007).  Regarding tax evasion, if empirical studies confirm the basic 
mechanisms of the deterrence models (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972, and Yitzhaki, 
1974), they also reveal that some people comply although the benefits of cheating 
clearly outweigh its monetary cost (See Alm, 1991, Andreoni et al., 1998, Cowell, 
1990, and Slemrod, 2007, for surveys). This has motivated the exploration of other 
dimensions of tax compliance, like tax morale, social norms (Slemrod, 1998; Torgler, 
2007; Kirchler, 2007), ethics (Blumenthal et al., 2001), or conformity (Myles and 
Naylor, 1996; Fortin et al., 2007).  We adopt a complementary approach by 
investigating the influence of emotions on cheating behavior with an application to 
tax evasion.  Economists have not widely explored yet the role of emotions in 
cheating behavior.  We aim at contributing to fill this gap.1 
We claim that both the cognitive deliberation preceding income reporting and the 
realization of an audit, possibly followed by sanctions, involves emotions.  We 
                                                
1  Although Bentham early incorporated emotions in his theory of utility, economists have only 
recently studied the role of emotions in decision-making (Elster, 1996, Loewenstein, 2000). They have 
identified their influence on reciprocity (Ben-Shakhar et al., 2007), punishment (de Quervain et al., 
2004), or investment decisions (van Winden et al., 2008).  
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assume that emotions associated with reporting, audit, and sanctions inform and 
influence the agents’ deliberation and therefore, constitute a driving force of behavior.  
Various emotions might be related to compliance or evasion.2  Individuals might 
experience both anticipatory emotions when evaluating the risk associated with 
underreporting and anticipated emotions when anticipating how bad they will feel if 
audited and punished and how good and relieved if not audited.3   
We also expect that, ex post, the detection of cheating raises emotions which intensity 
is increased when deception is made public.  In particular, detected evaders may feel 
regret and guilt even when the information is not spread out and shame if their 
cheating behavior is made public.4   This is at least what the authorities expect when 
they publicly expose the offenders.5  Since it is difficult to cope with a damaged 
reputation, shame avoidance might have a larger impact on future compliance than its 
private counterpart (on such amplification effect, see Kahneman and Miller, 1986). 
Our paper is original in that our laboratory experiment links economic behavior in an 
income-reporting game to physiological measures of emotions and self-reports of 
emotions.  In our benchmark treatment, each subject receives an income that is taxed 
at a proportional rate.  He has to decide how much income he is willing to report.  He 
faces a probability to be audited, in which case he must pay a penalty for 
underreporting.  The picture treatment follows the same rules except that an 
                                                
2 When the product of the tax is used for a charitable cause, Harbaugh et al. (2007) show that 
mandatory taxation entails neural activity in brain areas that are related to rewards. 
3 As defined by Loewenstein et al. (2001): “Anticipatory emotions are immediate visceral reactions to 
risks and uncertainties. Anticipated emotions are typically not experienced in the immediate present but 
are expected to be experienced in the future…anticipated emotions are a component of the expected 
consequences of a decision...” (p. 268).  
4 Interestingly, Allingham and Sandmo (1972) explicitly mention that tax evasion may be limited if the 
individuals fear losing their reputation, but do not include this consideration in their model. In 
psychology, see Seiter and Bruschke (2007) on the role of guilt and shame in deception. 
5 While pillories have been used in many cultures, the Web provides, nowadays, many examples of 
such policies. For example, the Chicago police department displays the pictures and home addresses of 
arrested prostitute patrons; a listing of convicted pedophiles is available in every state in the U.S.A.; the 
government of Canada displays the names of citizens convicted of fiscal fraud.  We have not found any 
empirical estimation of their efficiency.  
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individual’s cheating behavior is publicly revealed through the public display of his 
picture.  This allows us to differentiate the impact of monetary versus non-monetary 
sanctions by holding the expected monetary return of evasion constant.  
To measure the emotional arousal associated with the reporting decisions and the 
feedback on audits, we record the subjects’ Skin Conductance Responses (SCR) 
(Bradley, 2000).  The SCR is a phasic component of the electrodermal activity 
primarily controlled by the sympathetic division of the autonomic nervous system 
(Dawson et al., 2000).  It is associated to emotional arousal in a wide range of 
psychological states and processes (Boucsein, 1992).  We also use affective self-
reports to assess the emotional arousal (low-high intensity) and the hedonic valence 
(pleasant-unpleasant) dimensions of emotions as a robustness check and as a 
complement.6  Indeed, research in psychology has shown that emotional arousal and 
valence can explain most of the variance in emotions (Russel and Mehrabian, 1974; 
Lang et al., 1992; Anders et al., 2004).  An additional originality of our experiment is 
that we elicit emotions in a group context. 
Our experiment delivers several major findings.  Subjects who express increased 
SCR, i.e. higher anticipated and anticipatory emotional arousal, are more likely to 
evade and evade more.  Emotional arousal at the time of audit is increased by the 
prospect of additional earnings and the avoidance of certain losses, and also by 
monetary and non-monetary sanctions.  These results show that, despite the sterility of 
the environment, it is possible to capture emotions and the fear of social stigma in the 
laboratory.  Indeed, being in an environment where the picture of the detected evader 
is publicly displayed raises more emotions in case of an audit and deters cheating. In 
                                                
6 Self-reports on the emotional valence and arousal dimensions are correlated with autonomic and 
somatic responses to emotional stimuli, while SCR positively correlate with the emotional arousal 
independently of valence (Bradley and Lang, 2001) 
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contrast, while being audited raises emotions and reduces the extent of evasion in the 
following period, the higher the fine the higher the proportion of evaded income.  As 
Baldry (1986) has shown that tax evasion is not a gamble because it involves moral 
considerations, our findings strongly support the analyses on the importance of tax 
morale.  People do not only feel anxiety because of the monetary prospects of a risky 
decision but also due to the moral implications associated with the risk of a public 
exposure of their behavior.  This is a major finding because it suggests that a tax 
authority could better discourage evasion by increasing the emotional cost of evasion. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the 
experimental design and the predictions. Section 3 analyzes the results. Section 4 
discusses the results and concludes. 
2. THE EXPERIMENT 
A. Experimental design 
Two treatments. The benchmark treatment involves a group of eight players who 
receive an individual income I, with .  Each income level is 
randomly assigned to two subjects in each period, but this is not common information. 
The players are requested to report their income that will be taxed at a uniform tax 
rate of 55%, by means of a scrollbar of which maximum graduation corresponds to 
the subject's actual income. To produce a stronger test of social emotions, we do not 
redistribute the tax funds to the subjects who are informed that these paybacks will go 
into research funds for other experiments.7   
                                                
7 We acknowledge that we do not know the subjects’ valuation of the taxes and fines collected that may 
be considered as a specific form of a public good. The subjects do not, however, benefit from these 
funds directly. If this procedure has nevertheless influenced decisions, in one way or the others, there is 
no reason to believe that the subjects’ reaction will be different between treatments since we use a 
within-subject design. 
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The players know that their reported income can be audited according to a certain 
cutoff audit scheme and that this audit will entail the payment of a fine if the reported 
income is less than the actual income.  The realism of the design has been 
strengthened by replicating the structure of income reporting, by using non-neutral 
terms in the instructions so that it makes no doubt that underreporting means 
cheating,8 and by introducing an endogenous audit rule.  The probability of an audit is 
endogenous in that it depends on the median report in the group, and this is made 
common information.9  If the reported income of a player is among the four highest 
reported incomes in the group, his audit probability is 35%.  If his reported income is 
among the four lowest reported incomes, his audit probability is 65%.  If all subjects 
report the same amount, the probability is uniform and equal to 50%.10 The reason 
why low-reported-income players have a higher probability of being audited is 
because reporting low incomes signals to the tax authority, which knows the 
distribution of income but not each individual’s income, that the individual might 
have underreported by a substantial amount. The tax authority has less to gain in 
auditing high reported incomes.  Another reason for this endogenous scheme is that 
one’s own evasion decreases the risk of audit of the other subjects (which is realistic 
since the auditing resources of the tax administration are constrained); therefore 
                                                                                                                                       
 
8 Using loaded terms loses some control over the subjects' preferences; on the other hand, it introduces 
context that makes mental scripts less necessary (Alm, 1991). Alm, McClelland and Schulze (1992) 
compare two experiments using either loaded or neutral wording and find no difference in behavior. 
9 In real settings, the probability of an audit depends on the taxpayer's decisions since reports convey 
information. While empirical analyses are plagued by such an endogeneity problem (Alm, 1991), 
experiments allow clearing it up by using random audit probabilities. Most experiments, however, do 
not analyze how endogenous probabilities influence decisions. Exceptions are Collins and Plumlee 
(1991), Alm et al. (1993), Cason and Gangadharan (2006), Cummings et al. (2009).   
10 These probabilities are above the usual enforcement levels in order to collect enough detection 
observations. Note that one can also find high rates in reality, for example against taxpayers who have 
been caught in the past or in the presence of cutoff rules such that a report lower than some cutoff level 
will be audited with certainty (see Torgler, 2007). Again, we create an environment hostile to the 
phenomenon we want to study since we suspect that frequent detection erodes the emotions associated 
with cheating, due to a habituation effect (Dawson et al. 2000). And this is what we observe in this 
experiment (see below).  
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evading taxes does not hurt the group members. While creating some 
interdependencies between the subjects, this auditing rule is hostile to the emergence 
of a social stigma and provides a stronger test of social emotions (see below).  The 
subjects are not informed on their individual audit probability (see Spicer and 
Thomas, 1982, and Alm, Jackson, and McKee, 1992, on the impact of uncertain audit 
probabilities on compliance).  They do not receive any feedback on others’ 
behavior.11 
If the player is not audited, his net income corresponds to his gross income minus the 
tax on his reported income.  If an audit concludes to underreporting, both the tax on 
the actual income and a fine are charged.  As in Yitzhaki (1974), the fine is 
proportional to the unpaid taxes; it is fixed at 20%, which is a realistic value 
(Andreoni et al., 1998).  
The picture treatment follows the same rules as the benchmark.  The only difference 
is that if an audit reveals that a player has underreported his income, his picture is 
displayed on his own screen and on the screens of other taxpayers.  This treatment 
aims at identifying whether public information on one’s own cheating involves 
additional emotions leading to more compliance.12  In a period, only one picture can 
be displayed on the screen of any subject; if more than one cheater have been audited, 
there is a random display of each picture on the screen of the non-audited subjects and 
                                                
11 An endogenous audit mechanism raises the possibility of potential coordination among participants. 
However, Alm and McKee (2004) have shown in their experiment that individuals find it difficult to 
coordinate on the zero-compliance equilibrium. Our endogenous audit rule depending on the median 
income report of the group of eight players makes this coordination even more difficult given that the 
game has no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies as discussed below. 
12 If subjects perceive the environment as one about cheating the experimenter rather than the group 
members (because tax funds are used for further research or because one’s own evasion reduces the 
audit probability of others), this treatment should not have a strong emotional or behavioral impact, 
especially since cheating the experimenter could be considered as acceptable from students who need 
money. 
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the honest audited taxpayers.13  The amount evaded by a cheater is not displayed since 
it could be an additional source of influence on individual decisions.  
We used a within-subject design to keep the subjects’ characteristics constant and 
increase statistical power. The sessions consisted of 30 periods, divided into six 
blocks of five periods. The benchmark treatment was implemented in periods 1 to 5, 
11 to 15, 21 to 25, and the picture treatment in the remaining periods. 
Eliciting risk attitude. A parsimonious procedure (see Charness and Gneezy, 2003) 
has been used in the preliminary part of the experiment to elicit the individual degree 
of risk aversion.  Each subject was endowed with 15 points (his show-up fee of €3) 
and had to decide how much to invest in a risky asset and how much to keep.  In case 
it fails, the amount invested is lost; in case of a success, the investment returns 2.5 
times its amount.  Each subject had also to choose one of two colors.  If this color is 
randomly drawn at the end of the session, with a 50% chance, the investment is a 
success.  A risk-neutral subject should invest his full endowment.  The lower the 
amount invested, the higher the degree of risk aversion.   
The "Physionomics lab" and the self-reports. We proceeded to the simultaneous 
and continuous electrophysiological (Skin Conductance Responses) recording of 
groups of eight interactive subjects until the end of the sessions.  Indeed, the literature 
in psychology and neurophysiology has established that SCR capture emotional 
arousal (Bradley et al., 2001).14  The method is exposed in details in Appendix 1.  The 
SCR have been analyzed for the decision and the feedback on audit.  
                                                
13 Displaying only one picture at a time does not allow the subjects to identify the number of evaders in 
the session. A subject who is caught cheating does not know if there were other cheaters and how many 
subjects can see his picture. 
14 A connection between SCR generation and the brain areas involved on higher stages of information 
processing (e.g. information uptake, decision and storage processes) has also been evidenced.  
However, the role of SCR as an indicator of cognitive effort is not clearly defined, probably due to the 
wide variety of theoretical and experimental approaches used (Boucsein, 1992). 
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In addition, at the end of each period, the subjects had to report their feelings at the 
moment of the audit by means of two 7-point Likert-type scales of emotional arousal 
(from extremely weak to extremely strong) and hedonic valence (from extremely 
negative to extremely positive).  Indeed, an adequate assessment of emotions requires 
an integration of behavior, verbal report and physiology (Bradley and Lang, 2001).  
While the physiological measures provide an autonomic measure of the subject’s 
emotional arousal, the self-reports unveil, backwardly, the subjective intensity and 
direction of emotions experienced by the subjects. Last, at the end of the session, we 
administered an attitudinal questionnaire on fraud.15  
The subjects’ payment consisted of the average earnings in two randomly selected 
periods in order to avoid possible wealth effects.  The instructions specified that a 
person who is not aware of the content of the experiment would pay the subjects in 
private in a different room; this was done to limit accountability. 
B. Predictions  
The predictions of this game in the vein of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and 
Yitzhaki (1974) are the same for both treatments if players are rational.  We assume 
that the utility function of the participants is linear in income.  The expected gross 
income, I, is 125.  For the symmetry of the game, we assume that each player believes 
that the others receive the same income with equal probability.  The probability to be 
audited, assuming that each player uses the same strategy, is p = 0.5*ALow + 
0.5*AHigh, with  ALow (AHigh) being the audit rate for those reporting income below 
                                                
15 Note that the self-reports do not inform more than SCR measures on the very nature of emotions 
(anger, guilt, …). An alternative would have been to ask the subjects to report the intensity of each of 
various possible feelings at the end of each period. But in addition to be time-consuming and boring, 
this could have focused too artificially the subjects’ attention on emotions. In the attitudinal 
questionnaire, the subjects had to report on a 7-point Likert-type scale their feelings (from extremely 
negative to extremely positive) regarding tax evasion by shopkeepers, fare-dodging, and offences 
against the Highway Code. 
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(above) the median.  Let t be the tax rate and f the penalty rate.  If an individual 
reports an amount R of his gross income I, his expected net income, ENI, is:  
                                     I - [ p( tI + ft(I - R)) + t(1-p)R ] = ENI       (1) 
If an individual reports his full income, then his net income, NI, is:       (2)       
The expected rate of return from reporting no income relatively to full income is:  
                                                     (3)
 
With the following parameters, t = 55%, f = 20%, ALow = 65% and AHigh = 35% (p = 
50%), the expected rate of return is 45%.  Full reporting is therefore a dominated 
strategy.  In addition, a subject may realize that it is easier to hide evasion when one 
receives a high income if he believes that other subjects have drawn a lower income. 
The game has no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies and the solution is a mixed 
strategy equilibrium with a positive compliance rate because a subject has always an 
incentive to deviate by reporting one unit more than the others to reduce his own audit 
probability to 35%.  The equilibrium cannot be easily characterized, but it should be 
similar in both treatments.16 However, the high expected return from evasion let us 
suppose that theoretical compliance should be low.   
In addition to risk aversion, anticipatory and anticipated emotions may lead players to 
comply more if the positive emotions raised by evasion, such as excitement due to the 
prospect of higher payoff, are outweighed by the expected psychic cost of being 
caught cheating.  The only reason why we could observe different decisions and 
patterns of SCR in the picture treatment than in the benchmark is that additional 
negative emotions may arouse from the anticipation of seeing one’s own picture or 
                                                
16  We cannot characterize the mixed strategy equilibrium because we use endogenous audit 
probabilities. In the picture treatment players get to know other players through the dissemination of 
pictures.  We do not believe however that the game should be considered as a repeated game since only 
one picture can be disseminated in one period and not all group members evade.    
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others’ pictures disseminated in the group although cheating generates positive 
externalities on others. 
C. Experimental procedures 
The experiment consisted of six sessions.  These sessions were conducted at the 
Groupe d’Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Lyon, France.  48 subjects (of 
which 63% were males), eight for each session, were recruited from undergraduate 
courses in the local business and engineering schools using the ORSEE software 
(Greiner, 2004).  All of the subjects were inexperienced in this type of experiment.  
The experiment was computerized using the REGATE software (Zeiliger (2000)).   
Upon arrival, the subjects drew a tag indicating their randomly designated computer.  
They were asked whether they allowed us to take a picture of their face and to do 
physiological recording (all have accepted).  It was made explicit that this picture 
would be used at some point during the experiment, that they would be informed 
before the possible use of the picture, and that they could quit immediately against the 
payment of the show-up fee.  They were guaranteed that their picture would be 
immediately destroyed at the end of the session and that they could attend the 
destruction.  The volunteers were required to keep a neutral face when we took their 
picture since studies in psychiatry show that emotions expressed on pictures may be 
contagious (Wild, 2003). Next, after washing their hands with a neutral soap for a 
better skin conductance, the subjects sat down in front of their computer.  The 
electrodemal electrodes filled with neutral-base paste were placed on the fingers of 
their non-dominant hand.  The electrodermal signal was then monitored and we 
proceeded to any adjustment required.  Concomitantly, the instructions for the 
preliminary part of the experiment were read aloud (Appendix 2). At the end of the 
questions answering (in private), more than five minutes from the placement of the 
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last electrodes had elapsed, allowing time for the paste to be absorbed by the skin and 
the electrodes to make good contact.  After the completion of the test of risk attitude, 
the instructions for the other parts were distributed and read aloud.  For the sake of 
realism, the instructions used tax-specific language but they avoided loaded terms 
such as ‘cheating’ or ‘lying’. We checked the understanding of the rules by means of 
a questionnaire.  During each period, to avoid any overlapping between different 
sources of emotions, we imposed a fixed duration to some events (12 seconds after 
the feedback on audit, 6.5 seconds after the picture display, 3 seconds after the 
feedback on payoffs), while decisions and affective self-reports were self-paced. 
At the end of the session, the subjects answered to the attitudinal questionnaire on 
fraud and to demographic questions, and they drew the color that determined whether 
their initial investment was a success or not.  On average, a session lasted 75 minutes, 
including preparation of the subjects for the physiological recording and cash 
payment.  The subjects received a show-up fee of €3 and earned €19.33 on average. 
3. RESULTS 
Overall, we find substantial treatment effects, as an environment where evading 
behavior is made public reduces the proportion of evaders and the amount evaded.  
Emotional arousal correlates with cheating behavior and punishment, especially when 
made public.  We provide descriptive statistics before considering the determinants of 
cheating behavior and the reactions to being audited.  
A. Summary statistics and non-parametric analysis 
Table 1 displays some descriptive statistics.  
(Table 1 about here) 
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Table 1 indicates first that the proportion of evaders increases with income (all pair-
wise comparisons indicate that the differences are significant at the 5% level).17 
Second, the level of income exerts a non-linear influence on the proportion of evaded 
income in evaders.18  Third, the proportion of evaders is marginally lower in the 
picture treatment than in the benchmark (p = 0.078), especially when incomes are 
either 50 (with a borderline p-value of p = 0.108) or 100 (p = 0.089).  In contrast, the 
proportion of evaded income is higher in the picture treatment than in the benchmark 
for incomes of 50 or 100 and lower for higher incomes (but the Mann-Whitney tests 
fail concluding on significant differences).  This suggests the existence of a selection 
effect: the subjects who care most about social sanctions do not evade when it is more 
risky to do so and those who take this higher risk do it for a higher proportion of 
income. 
Regarding emotions, Table 1 shows that the average SCR amplitude is higher when 
people underreport than when they comply (Wilcoxon test: p = 0.028).  It is twice as 
high when related to the reporting decision and three times higher when related to the 
feedback on audit.  Higher SCR are associated with more evasion.  In the benchmark, 
the average SCR amplitude at the time of decision is 0.11 for the subjects who evade 
less than 25% of their income; it rises to 0.17 when they evade between 25% and 49% 
of their income and to 0.22 when they evade between 50% and 74%, and 75% or 
more.  In the picture treatment, the corresponding values are 0.10, 0.20, 0.26, and 
                                                
17 In all the reported non-parametric statistics, a session gives one independent observation and all tests 
are two-sided. Mann-Whitney tests indicate that the proportion of evaders when the income is 200 is 
significantly higher than when the income is 150 (p = 0.034), 100 (p = 0.028) and 50 (p = 0.028). This 
proportion when the income is 150 is significantly higher than when the income is 100 (p = 0.046) and 
50 (p = 0.028). It is also significantly higher when the income is 100 than when it is 50 (p = 0.034).   
18 According to Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, the evaders dissimulate a higher proportion of their income 
when they earn 50 than when they earn 100 (p = 0.028), 150 (p = 0.027), or 200 (p = 0.028). On the 
other hand, the average proportion of evaded income is significantly higher when evaders receive an 
income of 200 than when their income is 150 (p = 0.046).  
 14 
0.19, respectively.19  For the subjects evading between 25% and 74% of their income, 
the picture treatment is significantly more arousing than the other treatment (Mann-
Whitney tests: p = 0.037 for the SCR measured at the time of decision, and p = 0.004 
for the SCR measured at the time of audit).  In this treatment, when the subjects evade 
75% of their income or more, the SCR is, however, not higher than when they evade 
between 50% and 74% (Mann-Whitney test, p > 0.10).  The people who report 
nothing in this environment are more likely to experience less psychic cost in 
cheating; or perhaps knowing they will feel bad if detected, they are better evading 
totally than a fraction of income.  This may explain why the average SCRs, both at the 
time of decision and audit, do not differ much by treatment in Table 1 (Mann-
Whitney tests, p > 0.10). 
To summarize, we find that there are marginally less evaders in the picture treatment 
than in the benchmark and that the average SCR amplitude is higher when people 
evade taxes than when they comply.  
B. Determinants of the evasion decision 
It is expected that the decision to evade and the amount of taxes unreported can be 
explained by different variables and by differential effects of the same variables 
affecting both decisions. In a panel setting, we will deal with this situation by 
referring to a two-step generalized Tobit model. 
Table 2 displays the results of this estimation procedure. First we estimate the 
determinants of the decision to evade taxes by means of a random-effects Probit 
model (column 1).  We include individual random effects to control for the lack of 
independence between each trial since each individual is observed 30 times.  This is 
                                                
19 At the time of audit, the corresponding values in the benchmark treatment are 0.08, 0.13, 0.17, and 
0.21; in the picture treatment, they are 0.07, 0.18, 0.20, and 0.18, respectively. 
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confirmed by the significant value of the coefficient.  The independent variables 
include each income value (the minimum income being the omitted reference 
category), the picture treatment, and a time trend.  They also include individual 
characteristics such as the subject’s SCR amplitude before the decision is entered, this 
variable interacted with the picture treatment, the subject’s gender, his/her age, the 
decision time and its squared value (that may indicate the depth of reasoning), and the 
amount invested in the lottery.   
We consider SCR amplitude as an exogenous variable and not as a consequence of the 
cheating decision.  Indeed, we assume that emotions consist of anticipatory and 
anticipated responses and they are used as a source of information in the decision-
making process, as stated by Loewenstein et al. (2001) – see also Zajonc (1984) on 
the primacy of affect.  Furthermore, emotional arousal is measured before the subject 
submits his report.20  
In the second step, we estimate two models of the proportion of evaded income by 
means of random-effects GLS models with robust standard errors.  In column 2 of 
Table 2, we add to the regressors the inverse of the Mill’s ratio extracted from the 
first-step estimation (à la Heckman) to control for a potential correlation among the 
error terms of the two equations.21   In column 3, we include individual time-invariant 
characteristics such as opinion on various types of fraud, mother’s education (equal to 
1 if the mother went to University), and existence of a loan to pay tuition fees as a 
                                                
20 Studies in psychology on decision-making support a three-stage model: (1) stimulus detection, (2) 
central processing and (3) motor execution. Miller and Low (2001) showed that the duration of motor 
execution stage is invariant across different reaction time tasks and its mean duration is around 200 ms. 
The stimulus detection’s duration is also recognized as invariant within the same task, leading to the 
conclusion that duration variability across trials is ultimately due to differences at the central 
processing stage.  In our experiment, both stimulus detection (income display) and motor execution 
(income reporting) procedures were kept constant across trials. Thus, we interpret the whole interval 
between stimulus detection and motor execution as part of the decision making process itself. 
21 The variables used in the regressions were dictated by the literature and to achieve identification of 
the parameters to be estimated. 
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proxy for the individual’s wealth.22  We also control for the first underreporting, for 
an audit in the previous period and the amount of the fine, if any.23  
(Table 2 about here) 
The decision to evade equation shows first that the likelihood of evading taxes 
increases directly in the level of income.  A second major finding is that an 
environment where deception is made public favors tax compliance relative to an 
environment where fraud is only punished by monetary sanctions.  Ceteris paribus, 
the risk of non-monetary sanctions diminishes by 8.2% the probability to evade taxes.  
This effect would have been probably even larger if we had directly redistributed the 
product of taxes among the subjects or in the absence of positive audit externalities.  
A third major result is that the SCR amplitude measured before the decision is made 
has a marginal positive influence on evasion (with no additional treatment effect). The 
more subjects are emotionally aroused, the more they choose to evade.  The marginal 
effect of one SCR point is 13.9% (note that SCR values are distributed between 0 and 
2.24).  In contrast, a subject who rejects the idea of cheating decides straight away to 
comply without experiencing a significant level of emotions. 
The decision to evade taxes is also associated, although non linearly, with a longer 
decision time (the compliers decide in 9.25 seconds on average while the evaders’ 
decision takes 12.42 seconds).  This could be associated with both the higher 
cognitive requirement involved in the decision to evade taxes if the subject elaborates 
mixed strategies and a possible tension between the expected payoff of underreporting 
                                                
22 Asking direct questions on individual resources is not a better alternative since almost no subject is 
working while studying. Asking about the parents’ income is not better because some students are 
reluctant to report this information or are simply not well informed. 
23 These lagged variables are not included in model 1 because this equation is better estimated on the 
full sample of observations since emotional arousal is stronger at the beginning of the game. In 
addition, it could have introduced an endogeneity bias since being fined in the previous period is 
directly associated with the decision to evade.  We have omitted the insignificant lagged audit variable.  
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and the emotional consequences of violating the social norm of non-cheating.  Indeed, 
a higher decision time may be correlated with both a higher cognitive activity and a 
higher emotional arousal (contrary to what is suggested by Rubinstein, 2007). 
Columns 2 and 3 in Table 2 show that conditional on the decision to evade, the 
picture treatment exerts a strong negative effect on the proportion evaded (-3.466 
points) while the higher the SCR, the higher the proportion evaded (with no additional 
effect of the treatment).  This behavior is probably emotionally driven since the 
dissemination of pictures in case of detection is not related to the importance of fraud.  
The proportion of evaded income is significantly lower when income is higher than 
50 although the relationship is not linear.  This higher evasion when income is low 
could result from the subjects having a reference level of income below which they 
are willing to take a higher risk of audit for avoiding the pain associated to a certain 
loss in case of compliance (see Bernasconi and Zanardi, 2004, and Dhami and Al-
Nowaihi, 2007, for an application of cumulative prospect theory to tax evasion).  In 
contrast with the decision to evade taxes, the decision time has a negative effect; 
indeed, those who decide to evade their income in full decide more quickly (8.69 
seconds instead of 13.14 for those who do not fully evade).   
In addition to a marginal reduction of the proportion of evaded income over time, the 
model in column 3 indicates that whereas being audited in the previous period reduces 
evasion weakly, the amount of the fine exerts the opposite effect.  Individuals 
probably attempt to regain the previous loss by evading more in the current period, 
which is also consistent with the reference income dependence.  People evade less 
when they underreport for the first time but this is significant at the 5% level only if 
this variable is included in model 2 (non reported regression) because this usually 
happens in the first period of the game while this period is eliminated from the third 
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regression.  A higher amount invested in the risky asset in the preliminary part of the 
experiment is associated with a higher proportion of evaded income, but significantly 
so only when we control for auditing in the previous period.  Males are not more 
likely to evade taxes than females but when they do, they dissimulate a higher 
proportion of income (which is consistent with the literature, see Slemrod, 2007).  
Having a mother with a university education reduces the proportion evaded, perhaps 
through the transmission of norms.   Having to reimburse a loan has a positive impact 
on evasion.  Lastly, a more negative opinion regarding drivers contriving the Highway 
Code is significantly correlated with less evasion, while a negative opinion on fare 
dodgers came short of significance (p = 0.116).  Variables such as the number of 
times a subject can see his own picture or the picture of other group members are not 
significant and are omitted.  Last, the inverse of the Mill’s ratios are insignificant. 
To summarize, an environment where deception is made public increases compliance 
and reduces the proportion of evaded taxes relative to a policy using only monetary 
sanctions.  We also find that a higher emotional arousal predicts more evasion and 
that if being audited in the previous period slightly reduces evasion, the amount of the 
fine increases it. 
C. Reactions to an audit 
We now focus on the determinants of the physiological SCR amplitude and self-
reported feelings when people receive a feedback on audits.  Indeed, the self-reports 
that have been collected at the end of each period regarding audit offer a robustness 
check and a complement to our analysis of physiological measures since the SCR 
measures cannot indicate the direction of emotions.  Table 1 has shown that the 
average self-reported emotional arousal, measured on a scale from 1 (extremely weak) 
to 7 (extremely strong), was higher for tax evaders (4.20) than for non-evaders (3.11).  
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This corroborates the SCR measures (0.16 and 0.05, respectively).  Similarly, evaders 
report less positive hedonic valence regarding the audit (3.84) than non-evaders 
(4.27), on a scale from 1 (extremely negative) to 7 (extremely positive).  In addition, 
the correlation coefficient between the SCR amplitude at the time of the audit and the 
self-reported arousal is significant and equal to 0.54. 
Three econometric models have been estimated to identify the determinants of 
emotional reactions to a feedback on audit.  Model 1 is a random-effects Tobit model 
in which the dependent variable is the SCR amplitude at the time of the audit.  Models 
2 and 3 are ordered Probit models with robust standard errors and clustering at the 
individual level in which the dependent variables are the self-reported emotional 
arousal and the hedonic valence of feelings, respectively.  The independent variables 
comprise a time trend, the proportion of evaded income, and a dummy variable for the 
first evasion.  We also include a dummy variable for the first audit, the amount of the 
fine, the display of the subject’s own picture, the first time the subject’s picture is 
displayed, the current number of times the subject’s picture has been displayed since 
the beginning of the game.  Overall we expect that being sanctioned should increase 
emotional arousal and should exert a negative impact on hedonic valence while not 
being caught should raise positive emotions.  The results are reported in Table 3. 
(Table 3 about here) 
The SCR amplitude indicates that the emotional arousal increases marginally in the 
degree of tax evasion when the subject receives a feedback on audit; this feeling is 
however not self-reported.   Other things equal, this could capture the emotional effect 
of a higher expected payoff.  The SCR amplitude is also higher when a subject evades 
for the first time although the self-reported intensity of feelings indicates the opposite. 
Reported feelings are more negative when subjects evade for the first time, possibly 
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due to guilt.  They become more intense and more and more positive over time, 
possibly because of a dissipation of guilt. 
The first time a subject is audited also raises significantly more emotions.  An evader 
who is not audited is also emotionally aroused.  Since this is associated with a higher 
hedonic valence, this could be due to relief and the pleasure due to the avoidance of a 
loss.  Indeed, the average hedonic valence is 5.23 (3.94) for the evaders (compliers) 
who have not been audited and 2.49 (4.59) when they have been audited.  
Accordingly, a regression conducted on the sole compliers (not reported here) shows 
that being audited generates significant positive feelings. 
A major finding is related to the consequences of both monetary and non-monetary 
sanctions on emotions, with almost all of these effects being significant at the 1% 
level.  The higher the fine, the more the subject is emotionally aroused, and the more 
he expresses negative feelings, probably related to regret and anger.  Moreover, when 
the evader learns that his picture is going to be disseminated, his emotional arousal 
further increases (with an additional first-time effect on the SCR amplitude), although 
this effect tends to diminish with repetition.24  This is associated with more negative 
feelings, possibly related to shame; this interpretation is reinforced by the significant 
negative coefficient associated with the current number of times a subject has seen his 
picture disseminated, with no stronger effect of the first time his picture is displayed.   
These self-reports should be taken with caution however since the statistical power of 
the regressions is relatively low, especially in model 2.  In addition, due to their 
                                                
24  We have estimated the effect of seeing the pictures of other group members only on the self-
reported intensity and valence of feelings since self-reports are made at the end of each period (not 
reported here). The display of another’s picture has no impact on the emotional arousal but it is 
associated with positive feelings.  These feelings may capture a subject’s satisfaction of not having 
been audited himself if he evaded taxes, or his pleasure of seeing a cheater being caught if he complied.  
We cannot test this effect on SCR since at the time of the audit, the subjects do not know yet whether 
another group member has been caught. 
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subjective nature, they may be biased.  Physiological measures, that the subjects 
cannot easily control, are potentially more reliable.   We also acknowledge that we 
only capture here the direction of emotions but not their nature.  Overall, the results 
show nevertheless a large consistency between the SCR measures, the self-reported 
intensity and valence of feelings, and our behavioral predictions. 
To summarize, the higher the evasion, the higher the SCR magnitude when receiving 
a feedback on audit. The higher the fine, the more subjects are emotionally aroused, 
and the more negative are their feelings. This emotional arousal further increases 
when the evaders learn that their behavior will be exposed publicly.25 
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Deception may generate anticipatory emotions related to the risk of being detected 
and anticipated emotions related to both moral considerations and the prospect of 
higher monetary payoffs associated with cheating.  Tax evasion constitutes an 
archetypical example of deception by the economic agents.  This paper explores a 
complementary avenue to the standard deterrence models of tax evasion by testing the 
hypothesis that the prospect of evading taxes generates emotions in the individuals, 
which affect their actual behavior, especially when deception can be made public.  
We link individual behavior both to Skin Conductance Responses that provide a 
physiological measure of the emotional arousal uncontrolled by the individuals and to 
affective self-reports that inform on the valence and intensity of emotions.  
                                                
25 As suggest by a referee, exposing the amount not reported or in terms of the percentage of income 
not reported along with the picture of the participant caught underreporting his income will have added 
a nice feature to this research in terms of policy issue. Interestingly, Halla and Schneider (2009) based 
on a large micro data set of respondents from 29 OECD member countries suggest that moral values 
evolve endogenously and are determined by prices (i.e. the cost of acting morally). The picture 
treatment definitively affects the real price of cheating. 
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Our results are striking.  We provide the first evidence that cheating is correlated with 
the emotional arousal of the subjects before submitting their decision.  A higher 
emotional arousal is positively associated with both the likelihood of tax evasion and 
the amount evaded, indicating that this decision does not only result from the “cold” 
comparison between the monetary benefits and costs of evading taxes (without 
mentioning the social benefits that the subjects may derive from future research 
funding through taxes).  The cognitive deliberation involves “hot” processes activated 
by the emotional brain.  The subjects who comply are those who do not experience 
such emotions and they decide more quickly than evaders.  Our results add to the 
literature in neurosciences showing that rational decision-making should not be 
opposed to emotions (see the theory of somatic markers Damasio, 1994).   
Our findings also strongly support the importance of tax morale and justify 
incorporating moral dimensions in the standard models of tax compliance.  Indeed, 
when the subjects receive a feedback on their report audit, controlling for the 
proportion of evaded income, we find a strong physiological impact of the public 
display of the evaders' pictures on the emotional arousal in addition to monetary 
sanctions.  This may explain that when they are in an environment where non-
monetary sanctions coexist with monetary sanctions the subjects are less likely to 
cheat and when they do, they evade less.  Furthermore, while monetary fines increase 
later evasion, showing the tax evaders’ picture has the opposite effect.  The self-
reports reveal that both monetary and non-monetary sanctions raise negative 
emotions.  In contrast, learning that their report has not been audited generates 
positive feelings in evaders, probably due to the conjunction of relief and the joy of 
getting higher earnings than if they had complied. 
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There are reasons for caution in extrapolating these results.  In particular, students 
may not be representative of taxpayers and the size of our sample is relatively small.  
We have also used audit probabilities that are above the average enforcement values 
and we cannot measure how various audit probabilities would have changed decisions 
and emotions (which would be an interesting extension of our paper).  Moreover, 
cheating in our experiment may not be considered as bad as in a real setting since 
more cheating may lower the audit probability of other players.  One can, however, be 
relatively confident in the external validity of our results because if one observes that 
emotions arise even in the sterile environment of the laboratory with small monetary 
stakes, such high audit probabilities leading to frequent audits, and positive immediate 
externalities in the laboratory, they should be even greater when a yearly income is at 
stake in actual reporting decisions, with less frequent audits and negative externalities.  
Indeed, we have found that the first time a subject evades taxes, his emotions are 
stronger and more negative when he receives a feedback on being audited, while 
observing frequently one’s own picture affects emotional arousal negatively.  One can 
also suspect that when cheating hurts directly other members in a group, as if the 
product of taxes was immediately redistributed among the taxpayers, emotions would 
probably be stronger.  Therefore, we hope to have contributed to identify some 
relationships between emotions, sanctions, and cheating.  
A limitation is that our methodology does not allow us to identify the very nature of 
emotions.  We can, however, suggest interpretations.  Since higher SCR measured at 
the time of decision is associated with a higher probability to cheat and to a larger 
deception, this may be due both to the cheater’s anxiety related to the risk of 
deterrence and to the anticipated excitement of earning more money if not detected, 
and anticipated negative emotions if detected.  The emotions experienced after a 
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positive audit in the benchmark treatment are probably associated with private 
emotions such as guilt, regret, or anger, whereas those experienced in the picture 
treatment may be associated with public emotions such as shame or embarrassment.  
One can suggest two main directions for further research.  First, regarding economic 
modeling, the emotional costs and benefits of cheating should be included in the 
individual’s utility function in interaction with its expected monetary return.  With the 
public exposure of deception, people evade less.  Since we held the expected 
monetary return from evasion constant across treatments, this suggests that the net 
emotional cost of deception has been increased.  An interpretation is that when the net 
cost of anticipated and anticipatory emotions increases, people evade less.  Brain 
imaging could help in measuring these emotional costs and benefits with a distinction 
–if relevant- between the emotional costs associated with risk-taking and the 
emotional cost associated with norm violation. 
A second direction for research is related to institutional design.  We have found that, 
ceteris paribus, being in an environment where deception is made public reduces by 
8.20% the probability to cheat; for the evaders, it reduces by 3.88 points the 
proportion of evaded income although by design the non-monetary sanction does not 
depend on the amount evaded.  In contrast, while being audited reduces the proportion 
of evaded income by 2.92 points, we observe that the higher the fine, the higher the 
dissimulation of income in the following period.  This suggests that a policy 
threatening to denounce cheaters publicly with a reduced amount of fines –i.e. 
augmenting the emotional cost and reducing the monetary cost- might be more 
effective.  Further research is however needed to explore the potential backfiring 
effects of a public exposure of deception.  Indeed, once their reputation is lost, 
evaders may react by evading even more.  We have found that frequent exposure 
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raises more negative feelings but it also reduces the emotional arousal in case of an 
audit and overall we do not observe in the Picture treatment an increase of compliance 
over time.  It would be useful to manipulate experimentally the duration of social 
sanctions to see whether reintegrative shaming –i.e. offering an opportunity to restore 
reputation- circumvents the potential backfiring effects of these sanctions. 
 26 
REFERENCES 
Allingham, M., A. Sandmo (1972). “Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis”, 
Journal of Public Economics 1(3-4), 323-338. 
Alm, J. (1991). “A Perspective on the Experimental Analysis of Taxpayer 
Reporting”, The Accounting Review 66(3), 577-593. 
Alm, J., G.H. McClelland, and W.D. Schulze (1992). “Why do people pay taxes?”, 
Journal of Public Economics 48, 21-48. 
Alm, J., B. Jackson, M. McKee (1992). “Institutional Uncertainty and Taxpayer 
Compliance”, American Economic Review 82(4), 1018-1026. 
Alm, J., M.B. Cronshaw, and M. McKee (1993). “Tax Compliance with Endogenous 
Audit Selection Rules”, Kyklos 1, 27-45. 
Alm J. and M. McKee (2004). “Tax compliance as a coordination game”, Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization 54(3), 297-312. 
Alm J. and M. McKee (2006). “Audit Certainty, Audit Productivity and Taxpayer 
Compliance”, National Tax Journal 59, 801-16. 
Anders, S., M. Lotze, and M. Erb (2004). “Brain Activity Underlying Emotional 
Valence and Arousal: A Response-Related fMRI Study”, Human Brain Mapping 
23, 200-209. 
Andreoni, J., B. Erard, and J. Feinstein (1998). “Tax Compliance”, Journal of 
Economic Literature 36, 818-860. 
Baldry, J.C. (1986). “Tax evasion is not a gamble”, Economics Letters 22, 333-335. 
Ben-Shakar, G., G. Bornstein, A. Hopfensitz, and F. van Winden (2007). 
“Reciprocity and Emotions in Bargaining: Using Physiological and Self-Report 
Measures”, Journal of Economic Psychology 28, 314-323. 
Bernasconi, M., and A. Zanardi (2004). Tax evasion, tax rates, and reference 
dependence”, FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis 60(3), 422-445. 
Blumenthal, M., C. Christian, and J. Slemrod (2001). “Do Normative Appeals Affect 
Tax Compliance? Evidence from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota”,  
National Tax Journal 54(1), 125-138. 
Boucsein, W. (1992). Electrodermal Activity. Plenum Series in Behavioral 
Psychology and Medicine, Plenum. 
Bradley, M.M. (2000). “Emotion and motivation”. In Cacioppo, J.T., L.G. Tassinary, 
and G.G. Berntson (Eds). Handbook of Psychophysiology, Cambridge, MA: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Bradley, M.M. and P.J. Lang (2001). “Measuring emotion: Behavior, feeling and 
physiology”. In Lane, R. and L. Nadel (Eds). Cognitive Neuroscience of Emotion. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bradley, M.M., M. Codispoti, B.N. Cuthbert, and P.J. Lang (2001). “Emotion and 
Motivation I: Defensive and Appetitive Reactions in Picture Processing”, 
Emotion 1, 276-298. 
Cason, T.N., and L. Gangadharan (2006). “An experimental study of compliance and 
leverage in auditing and regulatory enforcement”, Economic Inquiry 44(2), 352-
366. 
Charness, G. and U. Gneezy (2003). “Portfolio Choice and Risk Attitudes: An 
Experiment”. Mimeo. 
 27 
Charness, G. and M Dufwenberg (2006). “Promises and Partnership”, Econometrica 
74(6), 1579-1601. 
Collins, J.H. and R.D. Plumlee (1991). “The Taxpayer's Labor and Reporting 
Decision: The Effect of Audit Schemes”, The Accounting Review 66, 559-576. 
Cowell, F. (1990). Cheating the Government: The Economics of Evasion. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press.  
Cummings, R.G., J. Martinez-Vazquez,  M. McKee, and B. Torgler (2009). “Tax 
morale affects tax compliance: Evidence from surveys and artefactual field 
experiments”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 70(3), 447-457. 
Damasio, A.R. (1994). Descartes’ Error, New York: Avon. 
Dawson, M. E., A.M. Schell, and D.L. Filion (2000). “The electrodermal system”. In 
Cacioppo, J. T., L.G. Tassinary, and G.G. Berntson (Eds.). Handbook of 
Psychophysiology, 2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Dhami, S., and A. Al-Nowaihi (2007). “Why do people pay taxes? Prospect theory 
versus expected utility theory”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 
64(1), 171-192. 
Edelberg, R. (1967). “Electrical properties of the skin”. In Brown, C.C. (Ed.). 
Methods in Psychophysiology. Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins. 
Elster, J. (1996). “Rationality and the Emotions”, The Economic Journal 106(438), 
1386-1397. 
Fortin, B., G. Lacroix, and M.C. Villeval (2007). “Tax Evasion and Social 
Interactions”, Journal of Public Economics 91 (11-12), 2089-2112. 
Gerschlager, C. (Ed.) (2005). Deception in Markets: An Economic Analysis. Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Gneezy, U. (2005). “Deception: The role of consequences”, American Economic 
Review 95(1), 384-394. 
Greiner B. (2004). An Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments. In: K.  
Kremer, V. Macho (Eds), Forschung und wissenschaftliches Rechnen 2003. 
GWDG Bericht 63; Göttingen: Ges. für Wiss. Datenverarbeitung; 2004. p. 79-93. 
Halla M. and F.G. Schneider (2009). Taxes and Benefits: Two Distinct Options to   
Cheat on the State? Research paper, IZA. 
Harbaugh, W.T., U. Mayr, and D.R. Burghart, (2007). “Neural Responses to Taxation 
and Voluntary Giving Reveal Motives for Charitable Donations”. Science 316, 
1622-1625. 
Kahneman, D. and D. Miller (1986). “Norm theory: Comparing reality to its 
alternatives”, Psychological Review 93, 136-153. 
Kirchler, E. (2007). The Economic Psychology of Tax Behaviour. Cambridge: 
Cambrigde University Press. 
Lang, P.J., M.M. Bradley,  and B.N. Cuthbert (1992). “A motivational analysis of 
emotion: reflex-cortex connections”, Psychological Science 3, 44-49. 
Loewenstein, G. (2000). “Emotions in Economic Theory and Economic Behavior”, 
American Economic Review 90(2), 426-432. 
Loewenstein, G.F., C.K. Hsee, E.U. Weber, and N. Welch (2001). “Risk as Feelings”, 
Psychological Bulletin 127, 267-286. 
 28 
Mehrabian, A. and J.A. Russell (1974). Approach to Environmental Psychology. 
Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Miller, J. O. and K. Low (2001). “Motor processes in simple, go/no-go, and choice 
reaction time tasks: a psychophysiological analysis”, Journal of Experimental 
Psychology 27(2), 266-289. 
Myles, G.D. and R.A. Naylor (1996). “A Model of Tax Evasion with Group 
Conformity and Social Customs”, European Journal of Political Economy 12(1), 
49-66. 
de Quervain, D.J.F., U. Fischbacher, V. Treyer, M. Schellhammer, U. Schnyder, 
A. Buck, and E. Fehr (2004). “The Neural Basis of Altruistic Punishment”, 
Science 305, 1254-1258. 
Rubinstein A. (2007). “Instinctive and Cognitive Reasoning: A Study of Response 
Times”, Economic Journal 117(523), 1243-1259.  
Russell, J.A. and A. Mehrabian (1977). “Evidence for a three-factor theory of 
emotions”, Journal of Research in Personality 11, 273-294. 
Sanchez-Pages, S. and M. Vorsatz (2007). “An Experimental Study of Truth-Telling 
in Sender-Receiver Game”, Games and Economic Behavior 61(1), 86-112. 
Seiter, J.S. and J. Bruschke (2007). “Deception and Emotion: The Effects of 
Motivation, Relationship Type, and Sex on Expected Feelings of Guilt and Shame 
Following Acts of Deception in United States and Chinese Samples”. 
Communication Studies, 58(1),  1-16. 
Slemrod, J. (1998). “On voluntary compliance, voluntary taxes, and social capital”,  
National Tax Journal LI, 485-492.  
Slemrod, J. (2007). “Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion”, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 21(1), 25-48. 
Spicer, M.W. and J.E. Thomas (1982). “Audit probabilities and the tax evasion 
decision: An experimental approach”, Journal of Economic Psychology 2, 241-
245. 
Torgler, B. (2007). Tax Compliance and Tax Morale. A Theoretical and Empirical 
Analysis. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.  
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service. (2006). Updated 
Estimates of the TY 2001 Individual Income Tax Underreporting Gap. Overview. 
Washington, D.C.: Office of Research, Analysis and Statistics. 
Wild, B. (2003). “Are emotions contagious? Evoked emotions while viewing 
emotionally expressive faces: quality, quantity, time course and gender 
differences”.  Psychiatry Research, 102(2), 109-124. 
van Winden, F., M. Krawczyk, and A. Hopfensitz (2008). “Investment, Resolution of 
Risk, and the Role of Affect”. Amsterdam, CREED Working Paper. 
Yitzhaki, S. (1974). A note on 'Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis', Journal 
of Public Economics 3(2), 201-202. 
Zajonc, R.B. (1984). “The primacy of affect”, American Psychologist 39(2), 117-123. 
Zeiliger, R. (2000). “A Presentation of Regate”, Internet-Based Software for 
ExperimentalEconomics,http://www.gate.cnrs.fr/~zeiliger/regate/RegateIntro.ppt. 
Lyon: GATE.  
 29 
Table 1. Summary statistics 
 
 Benchmark 
treatment 
Picture  
treatment 
All treatments 
Proportion of evaders 
when income is 50 
when income is 100 
when income is 150 
when income is 200 
Proportion of evaded income by evaders 
when income is 50 
when income is 100 
when income is 150 
when income is 200 
Proportion of punished subjects 
Amount of taxes 
Amount of fines 
Payoffs 
Emotions:  SCR–decision in µSiemens 
Non-evaders 
Evaders 
Emotions: SCR – audit in µSiemens 
Non-evaders 
           Evaders 
Decision time in seconds 
Non-evaders 
           Evaders 
Self-reported emotional arousal: from 1 
(extremely weak) to 7 (extremely strong) 
           Non-evaders 
           Evaders 
Self-reported hedonic valence: from 1 
(extremely negative) to 7 (extremely positive) 
            Non-evaders 
            Evaders 
78.06 (41.42) 
51.67 (50.11) 
76.67 (42.41) 
89.44 (30.81) 
94.44 (22.97) 
50.34 (30.87) 
69.16 (38.13) 
45.71 (30.52) 
46.12 (28.42) 
47.80 (24.81) 
37.92 (48.55) 
55.11 (30.22) 
7.39 (5.55) 
67.08 (39.21) 
0.16 (0.27) 
0.09 (0 .17) 
0.18 (0.29) 
0.13 (0.27) 
0.05 (0.19) 
0.15 (0.28) 
12.68 (7.76) 
  9.73 (5.92) 
13.51 (8.02) 
 
3.91 (1.70) 
3.15 (1.80) 
4.12 (1.61) 
 
3.97 (1.66) 
4.32 (1.32) 
3.87 (1.74) 
67.22 (46.97) 
37.78 (48.62) 
56.11 (49.76) 
82.22 (38.34) 
92.78 (25.96) 
48.11 (31.02) 
78.32 (33.18) 
48.03 (33.70) 
38.34 (26.66) 
44.53 (23.88) 
35.56 (47.90) 
58.18 (29.64) 
7.06 (5.38) 
64.31 (36.78) 
0.15 (0.25) 
0.09 (0 .22) 
0.17 (0.26) 
0.13 (0.25) 
0.04 (0.11) 
0.17 (0.29) 
10.42 (5.73) 
  8.92 (5.57) 
11.15 (5.66) 
 
3.90 (1.81) 
3.08 (1.78) 
4.30 (1.69) 
 
3.94 (1.72) 
4.24 (1.32) 
3.80 (1.87) 
72.64 (44.60) 
44.72 (49.79) 
66.39 (47.30) 
85.83 (34.92) 
93.61 (24.49) 
49.31 (30.94) 
73.03 (36.30) 
46.69 (31.86) 
42.39 (27.82) 
46.18 (24.37) 
36.74 (48.23) 
56.65 (29.96) 
7.23 (5.46) 
65.70 (38.03) 
0.16 (0.26) 
0.09 (0.21) 
0.18 (0.27) 
0.13 (0.26) 
0.05 (0.15) 
0.16 (0.29) 
11.55 (6.91) 
  9.25 (5.72) 
12.42 (7.12) 
 
3.90 (1.75) 
3.11 (1.79) 
4.20 (1.65) 
 
3.96 (1.69) 
4.27 (1.32) 
3.84 (1.80) 
Number of observations 
Percentage of males 
Average amount invested in the lottery (/15) 
Percentage of negative sentiments regarding: 
Shopkeepers evading taxes 
Contraveners with highway code 
Fare dodgers 
        720                           720                           1440 
62.50  
9.38 (3.58) 
  
54.17 (49.84) 
85.42 (35.31) 
50.00 (50.02) 
Note: The Table indicates average values; the standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Table 2. Determinants of the proportion of evaded income (Heckman model) 
 
Proportion of evaded income (random-
effects  GLS models with  
robust standard errors) 
 Probability to evade 
(Random-effects Probit 
model)  (1) 
(2) (3) 
Income=50 (reference) 
Income = 100 
Income = 150 
Income = 200 
Picture treatment 
Time trend 
SCR amplitude 
SCR amplitude * picture Tr. 
Decision time 
Decision time2 
Investment in the lottery 
Male 
Age 
First time evasion 
Audit in t-1 
Amount of the fine in t-1 
Mother with university educ. 
Loan for paying studies 
Negative opinion on: 
*Shopkeepers evading taxes 
*Contraveners with highway code 
*Fare dodgers 
Inverse Mill’s ratio 
Constant 
- 
0.679 ***(0.124) 0.128 
1.635 *** (0.143) 0.245 
2.265*** (0.173) 0.307 
-0.361*** (0.111) -0.082 
0.001 (0.006) <0.001 
0.612* (0.351) 0.139 
-0.631 (0.438) -0.143 
0.077*** (0.020) 0.018 
-0.001** (<0.001) <-0.001 
0.045 (0.046) 0.010 
0.191 (0.336) 0.044 
-0.063*** (0.019) -0.014 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.250 (0.607) 
- 
-17.823*** (3.531) 
-18.930*** (4.788) 
-15.528*** (5.218) 
-3.881** (1.536) 
-0.117 (0.085) 
6.717** (3.388) 
-2.004 (4.435) 
-0.857*** (0.253) 
0.007* (0.004) 
0.956 (0.712) 
18.468*** (4.692) 
-0.232 (0.406) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
3.391 (5.894) 
57.015***(11.241) 
- 
-19.008*** (3.819) 
-20.733*** (5.250) 
-17.372*** (5.710) 
-3.466** (1.625) 
-0.156* (0.089) 
9.002** (4.191) 
-2.921 (5.178) 
-1.416*** (0.395) 
0.022** (0.009) 
0.924** (0.421) 
15.825*** (3.159) 
-0.029 (0.337) 
-12.065 (10.277) 
-2.922* (1.624) 
0.724*** (0.162) 
-8.879*** (3.261) 
8.661** (3.381) 
 
4.060 (3.298) 
-15.171*** (4.811) 
-5.309 (3.382) 
1.503 (6.381) 
77.091*** (10.413) 
Number of observations 
Log likelihood 
Wald  
Prob >  
 
R2 
1440 
-515.982 
313.36 
0.000 
0.489*** 
- 
1046 
- 
174.23 
 
0.000 
0.372 
0.301 
1003 
- 
366.98 
 
0.000 
0.131 
0.394 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses and the marginal effects of the coefficients in the Probit model 
are in italics. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, 
respectively.  
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Table 3.  Determinants of the SCR amplitude and of the level of affective self-reports 
when receiving a feedback on audit  
 
Dependent variables SCR amplitude  
RE Tobit model 
(1) 
Self-reported 
emotional arousal 
Ordered Probit  (2) 
Self-reported 
Hedonic valence  
Ordered Probit (3) 
Period 
Proportion of evaded income 
First time evasion 
Non audited evader 
First time audit 
Amount of the fine 
Display of own picture 
First time own picture 
Current number of times own 
picture 
Constant 
-0.001 (0.003) 
0.001* (<0.001) 
0.179*** (0.066) 
0.106*** (0.035)  
 0.301*** (0.067) 
  0.011*** (0.004) 
0.133*** (0.040) 
0.298*** (0.067) 
-0.021* (0.011) 
 
-0.181*** (0.043) 
0.035*** (0.010) 
<0.001 (0.002) 
-0.288*** (0.111) 
0.595*** (0.123) 
0.503*** (0.127) 
0.032** (0.016) 
0.570*** (0.120) 
0.114 (0.107) 
-0.148*** (0.056) 
 
- 
0.017** (0.007) 
<-0.001 (0.001) 
-0.335** (0.153) 
1.201***(0.165) 
0.186 (0.169) 
-0.065*** (0.017) 
-0.447*** (0.127) 
-0.072 (0.150) 
-0.077** (0.033) 
 
- 
Nb observations 
Nb left-censured obs. (%) 
Log (pseudo) likelihood  
Wald  
Prob >  
 
Pseudo R2 
1440 
777 (53.96) 
-747.416 
171.20 
0.000 
0.166*** 
- 
1440 
- 
(-2600.902) 
73.35 
0.000 
 - 
0.028 
1440 
- 
(-2326.374) 
126.18 
0.000 
- 
0.142 
Note: Models 2 and 3 use robust standard errors and clustering at the individual level.  * and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 0.10 and 0.01 level, respectively. The SCR values lie between 0 
and 2.129. The self-reported emotional arousal variable can take any integer value between 1 
(extremely low) and 7 (extremely high). The hedonic valence variable is coded from 1 (extremely 
negative) to 7 (extremely positive).  
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Appendix. The physionomics laboratory and the skin conductance data analysis 
 
Experimental sessions took place in a noiseless room with stable temperature set to 
21oC. Skin conductance activity was recorded with a BIOPAC MP150W system and 
two TEL100C telemetry modules (BIOPAC Systems, EU). Two Ag/AgCl electrodes 
filled with 0.5% saline in a neutral-base paste were placed on the subject’s distal 
phalanges of the middle and the index fingers of the non-dominant hand, after the 
attachment site had been cleaned with a neutral soap (Dawson et al., 2000). A 
constant voltage of 0.5 V was applied between the electrodes. The skin conductance 
signal was amplified (x 2000) and low-pass filtered (30 Hz) before being sampled at 
125 Hz. Skin conductance activity was continuously recorded until the end of the 
session.  
Regarding the skin conductance analysis, the skin conductance signal was low-pass 
filtered at 0.5 Hz offline, using a fifth-order Butterworth low-pass digital filter. Skin 
Conductance Responses (SCR) onset and peak were automatically detected, when the 
first derivative of the filtered signal changed sign, by a routine written in Matlab (The 
MathWorks Inc., USA). Onsets were identified by a negative to positive zero 
crossing, while peaks were identified by a positive to negative zero crossing. The 
SCR amplitude was calculated as the difference between the signal amplitude at the 
peak and the onset times. The SCR amplitude was thresholded at 0.02 µS (Dawson et 
al., 2000). The whole signal was visually inspected prior to further analysis and false 
SCR detections were removed. The detection of an accelerative deflection during the 
interval between onset and peak times indicated SCRs overlapping during rise time. 
In that case, the two SCRs were i) separated, if they could be related to different 
events (according to the epochs defined below), or ii) summed together, if they were 
related to a single event (see Boucsein, 1992). In the case of responses overlapping 
during recovery time, Edelberg (1967) has shown that the amplitude scoring based on 
the difference between the signal amplitude at the peak and the onset times is 
sufficiently accurate and it is used as a standard procedure. In order to minimize SCR 
overlapping between events of interest, we imposed a minimum interval between 
events of six seconds.   
In long-term exosomatic continous current recording, skin conductance signal may 
show a downward drift that is usually associated to a progressive polarization of 
electrodermal electrodes (Edelberg, 1967). An adequate correction of drift is only 
possible when calibration values are recorded during the signal acquisition and it is 
not an imperative pre-processing procedure for short-term recordings (Boucsein, 
1992). For that reason, SCR amplitudes were not corrected for electrodermal activity 
drift in our analysis. SCR habituation effect was balanced across treatments since 
every treatment had the same number of periods. The habituation effect was further 
accounted within the regression model by the introduction of time as confound. SCRs 
were analyzed for the decision, the feedback on audit and the feedback on payoff 
events. SCRs with onset between 1.0 and 3.0 s after the beginning of an audit or 
payoff were assumed specific to the event. With respect to the decision event, given 
its self-paced duration, SCRs were allowed onset time from 1.0 s after the subject is 
informed on his income until his decision. Indeed, we are especially interested in 
measuring the intensity of emotions before the subject makes his reporting decision, 
because it should capture the emotional content of the subject’s deliberation. 
 
